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Racial Sovereignty 
 
Debates1 around sovereignty are back on the map, having been 
reinvigorated in popular discourse around Brexit and the election of 
Donald Trump. Across both political contexts, it is now common to hear 
sovereignty invoked as a response to numerous contemporary issues: 
globalisation, deindustrialisation, international trade-agreements, 
immigration, development, energy policy, terrorism, human rights et 
cetera. Less prevalent are discussions of its meaning. Sovereignty is 
widely assumed to denote ‘taking back control’ over a nation’s politics and 
‘independence’ from outside forces. Presented in this way, sovereignty 
appears disconnected from the considerably more contentious politics of 
race that have characterised Brexit and Trump’s election (Bhambra 
2017). In fact one curiosity of contemporary uses of sovereignty is its 
repeated appearance alongside explicit disavowals of racism. As one 
British newspaper, The Sun (2017), wrote: ‘Brexit voters were “mainly 
driven by taking back control of law-making powers from EU” – not 
racism’. 
  
That such appeals to sovereignty are presented by their proponents as 
relatively unproblematic is perhaps indicative of the concept’s resonance 
with common-sense notions of the role and function of the nation-state. 
Less acknowledged, by both proponents and critics alike, is how these 
seemingly ‘race-blind’ demands for sovereignty have been deployed to 
articulate a set of politics that are nonetheless racialised. The slogan 
‘taking back control’, for example, has expressed ideas of authority and 
independence alongside fears of perceived threats from racialised Others 
(in the form of immigration, terrorism, or non-European culture). The 
idea of sovereignty has therefore been central to the articulation of 
postracial discourses, involving the ‘self-conscious disavowal of racism 
and racist intent, while simultaneously serving to attack or problematize 
the existence or behavior of certain racialized groups’ (Pitcher, 2006, 
p.535).  
  
In contemporary debates around sovereignty, then, we find a conundrum: 
how and why is it that this ‘essentially contested’ term remains so 
uncontested (Leigh and Weber 2018)? This question should not be 
unfamiliar to International Relations (IR) scholars. Despite important 
interventions from critical perspectives, orthodox conceptions of 
sovereignty as the foundational grammar of ‘the international’ remain 
resilient (Costa Lopez et al, 2018, p.491). Here too, sovereignty is 
typically defined as ‘authority over a territory occupied by a relatively 
fixed population, supposedly necessary to protect that territory and its 
citizens from external [and internal] threats’ (Leigh and Weber 2018). It 
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is notable, then, that long-held scholarly assumptions about modern 
sovereignty within IR shares a common language with the politics of 
Trump and Brexit. 
  
This article therefore asks: what might IR say about these mobilisations 
of its core disciplinary concept? How might moving outside of IR into 
interdisciplinary conversations around race help us understand 
contemporary uses of sovereignty? Is it possible to think about 
sovereignty independently of race? In this article, I argue against the 
dominant wisdom in IR that sovereignty and race are analytically and 
historically discrete. In contrast, I show the ways in which race permeates 
and structures modern sovereignty, whereby ‘claims to sovereignty are 
woven through and require a specific relationship to race’ (Leigh and 
Weber, 2018). 
  
I suggest that the underexplored relationship between race and 
sovereignty is best resolved by the term ‘racial sovereignty’.2 My use of 
racial sovereignty draws its inspiration from similar theorisations of race 
in the ideas of ‘racial capitalism’ (Robinson, 1981) and ‘racial states’ 
(Goldberg, 2002). Like these terms, racial sovereignty denotes a 
conceptual drawing together of social relations, histories and practices 
typically understood as unrelated. Racial sovereignty is a term which 
bridges the analytical and historical separation of race and sovereignty, 
offering an alternative theorisation of sovereignty in which the structuring 
effects of racism are disclosed and opened for analysis. I suggest using 
the term racial sovereignty can give us a better purchase on both 
historical formations of sovereignty and contemporary calls for its renewal 
in a context of racist resurgence. 
  
This article therefore contributes to interdisciplinary conversations on the 
question of race and racism. Although discussions of race and racism are 
present in IR (see among others Anievas, Manchanda and Shilliam, 2014; 
2017 Henderson, 2013; Jones, 2008; Krishna, 2001; Sabaratnam, 2019; 
Thompson 2013; Vitalis, 2015; Younis 2018), they have at times 
overlooked their contestation as categories of analysis outside of the 
confines of the discipline. This ‘united front’ has undoubtedly been useful 
in carving out a space of possibility – where discussions around race and 
racism can take place in IR – but they also have the effect of glossing 
over some otherwise profound theoretical and political differences. I say 
this less to pick a fight but more to suggest that an attentiveness to these 
points of contestation can enable IR as a discipline to actively participate 
in debates around racism today. That is, if discussions of racism outside 
of the discipline can inform IR debates on sovereignty the reverse may 
also true: a focus on sovereignty might help us better understand racism. 
 
This is especially pertinent in a context where contemporary discussions 
around race are regularly weighed down by fixations on identity and 
culture (which are important ‘but not to the exclusion of all else’, 
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Bhattacharyya, 2018: 2). In this article, I argue that this tendency has (in 
small part) been produced by ‘the orthodox account’ of sovereignty as a 
distinctly postracial discourse generated within IR. In contrast, this article 
conceptualises the materiality of racism by prompting an analytical focus 
on the specific practices denoted by racial sovereignty. In drawing 
together authority, territory and population as its defining components, 
sovereignty is arguably a distinctive racialising practice in its capacity to 
affect how we understand the classifications of, relationships between, 
and the technologies of control over lands and peoples. These are always 
racialised issues. More precisely, this article aims to show how racial 
sovereignty is a practice of racialisation which emerges as a response to 
colonial crisis: ‘the crisis occasioned when colonisers are threatened with 
the requirement to share social space with the colonised’ (Wolfe, 2016: 
14). Although at first glance such a definition might appear applicable 
only in certain historical moments, I argue the opposite is true: racial 
sovereignty is a mode of analysis which captures practices that extend 
and circulate beyond specific acts of colonisation. 
  
In the first section, I demonstrate how the ‘orthodox account’ of 
sovereignty in IR has generated an analytical separation of race and 
sovereignty and, with it, produced IR’s contribution to postracial 
discourse. In the second section, I provide a closer explanation of the 
terms ‘racial sovereignty’, ‘racialisation’ and ‘colonial crisis’. The purpose 
of this section is to reconnect the relationship between race and 
sovereignty that has otherwise been denied by the orthodox account. In 
the third section, I show how the making of racial sovereignty can be 
found in a set of practices mobilised by English settlers during the 17th 
century colonisation of Virginia. By demonstrating the co-articulation of 
sovereignty and racialisation through practices of colonial dispossession, I 
connect histories of sovereignty and colonial violence that have otherwise 
been abstracted from and obscured the orthodox account. In the fourth 
section, I argue that the Virginian experience is not simply of historical 
interest but helps us better understand criticisms of ‘recognition’ found in 
the anticolonial tradition. By reviewing these criticisms, this section helps 
us understand racial sovereignty as structural and ongoing, rather than a 
finished matter. In the fifth section, I demonstrate how contemporary 
assertions of racial sovereignty in the context of Brexit disclose an 
otherwise concealed colonial crisis. I then conclude with the claim that 
interrogations of racial sovereignty are not solely of historical interest but 
carry political significance for our understanding of the world today. 
Containing race in the orthodox account 
Rob Walker (1993: 166) once famously warned, ‘the very attempt to treat 
sovereignty as a matter of definition and legal principle encourages a 
certain amnesia about its historical and culturally specific character’. 
Attempting to interrogate the historical and cultural specificity of 
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sovereignty has therefore been a core part of IR’s collective research 
programme and one of its foundational disciplinary myths (Osiander, 
2001). And yet, although numerous engagements have sought to 
overcome the amnesia that Walker lamented (Bartelson, 1995; Weber, 
1998; Walker, 1993), the relationship between race and sovereignty 
remains underexplored (for exceptions see Anghie, 2005; Doty, 1996a; 
Grovogui, 1996; Mbembe 2001; Puar, 2017; Salt, 2018; Shilliam, 2006; 
Weber, 2016).3 One curiosity in the study of sovereignty is therefore why 
– despite these critical engagements – the significance race and racism 
continues to be so effectively concealed. 
  
In this section, I argue that the analytical and historical separation of race 
and sovereignty is not accidental but produced by a set of discursive 
moves in the ‘orthodox account’ of sovereignty’s history. The orthodox 
account is far from the only story of sovereignty but is targeted here 
because of its significance and durability, from its first classical treatment 
in English School histories of the 1980s (see Watson and Bull, 1984), 
through the constructivist and liberal hegemony in the 1990s and 2000s 
(see Jackson, 2007; Philpott, 2001; Reus-Smit, 2001; Ruggie, 1993; 
Strang, 1996), right up to more contemporary iterations (see Clapton, 
2017; Holsti, 2018; Reus-Smit, 2013). Such is the continual reproduction 
of the orthodox account that it now functions as an ‘IR common-sense’. It 
is therefore interrogated here as symptomatic of a discursive procedure 
through which race is separated from sovereignty, analytically and 
historically, forming IR’s own distinctive contribution to postracial forms of 
thinking. A typical synopsis of the orthodox account – drawn from the 
above citations – goes something like this: 
  
Around the 16th-17th century, European states broke the shackles of 
religious authority and established mutually recognised sovereign states. 
Sovereignty made ‘differentiation’ the constitutive element of modern 
territorial states; it articulated absolute conceptions of authority within 
political communities (an ‘inside’) and exclusivist legal distinctions 
between them (an ‘outside’). Institutionalised in the 1648 Treaty of 
Westphalia, the defining components of modern sovereignty – authority, 
territory, population and recognition – were pulled together and 
combined. Meanwhile, with colonialism, these European states were also 
busy conquering other parts of the world, often at the expense of ‘political 
authorities’ elsewhere. To help them in this endeavour, Europeans 
constructed norms that distinguished between ‘civilised’ and ‘uncivilised’ 
states. European states imagined themselves as having reached the 
requisite standard of civilisation to legitimately possess (and recognise 
each other as possessing) sovereignty. In contrast, non-European states 
were imagined by Europeans to be uncivilised and therefore incapable of 
self-rule and sovereignty as such. European sovereignty over these non-
European domains was subsequently justified as part of the civilising 
mission of colonial tutelage. It was only with post-WWII decolonisation 
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that this hierarchy was challenged by the uncivilised and recognition was 
bequeathed by the colonisers to formerly colonised states. So, while 
colonialism once informed a historical division between who is and who is 
not recognised as sovereign, this was eventually overcome through the 
universal extension and realisation of the sovereignty principle to formerly 
colonised nations. 
  
How does the orthodox account separate race and sovereignty? In a 
particularly suggestive discussion, Sankaran Krishna (2001) outlines two 
discursive strategies that produce a wilful amnesia around race within IR. 
The first, ‘abstraction’, serves to disconnect IR’s object of study from its 
constitutive colonial histories and social relations of violence, 
dispossession and alienation. The second, ‘redemption’, inscribes within 
IR narratives a set of deferred promises that these constitutive violences 
will eventually be overcome. Drawing on Frederic Jameson, Krishna 
argues both abstraction and redemption are ‘strategies of containment’, 
which ‘allows what can be thought to seem internally coherent in its own 
terms, while repressing the unthinkable . . . which lies beyond its 
boundaries’ (Jameson cited in ibid. 406). Containment is: 
‘a means at once of denying those intolerable contradictions that lie hidden 
beneath the social surface, as intolerable as that Necessity that gives rise to 
relations of domination in human society, and of constructing on the very 
ground cleared by such denial a substitute truth that renders existence at 
least partly bearable’ (Dowling cited in ibid.). 
To Krishna’s discussion, I add the idea of ‘closure’ to make sense of the 
orthodox account’s distinctly postracial character. Closure is the means 
through which racism is presented as a ‘solved problem’ in international 
relations and locked-off as an object of analysis; when it comes to race 
the ‘case is closed’. It is through closure that the otherwise ‘intolerable 
contradictions’ that undergird the construction of sovereignty are made 
internally coherent. In the second section, I propose ways of thinking that 
might unearth these intolerable contradictions. Before I do, let us 
interrogate how they are denied in the orthodox account by examining its 
strategies of ‘abstraction’ and ‘redemption’ in turn. 
  
Firstly, the orthodox account presents Europe as a unique world-making 
agent and a prime mover of history, where the innovation of modern 
sovereignty is first generated within its pristine boundaries and then 
‘diffused’ elsewhere. This claim rests on a geo-historical abstraction 
whereby European states are viewed as self-propelling actors that are 
hermetically sealed from external – non-European – relations, histories, 
relations or influences. In this Eurocentric narrative, colonialism acts as a 
force through which already fashioned European norms are spread and 
universalised, but does not figure as a structural condition that 
(re)produces those norms (Bhambra 2007: 91). 
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Arguably, this is itself an outcome of the idea of sovereignty, which 
conceptually demarcated the modern state ‘as the object of empirical 
inquiry with an inside and an outside where the outside (e.g., the 
colonies) was not seen as having a relation to the inside’ (ibid. 109). 
Here, the racial hierarchies that colonialism produced and functionally 
depended on are treated as distinct from and outside of European 
modernity. Put differently, the spatial separation of inside/outside 
produced by sovereignty generates an associated historical closure 
around the role of race in its origins and making. With this Eurocentric 
assumption in place, the orthodox account is able to generate 
theorisations of sovereignty by abstracting from racialised histories of 
European colonial violence, dispossession and alienation (Krishna, 2001: 
401-2). 
  
Secondly, we see in the orthodox account strategies of redemption, ‘of 
overcoming the alienation of international society that commenced in 
1492’ (ibid.: 402). Whereas in Krishna’s critique this is a ‘deferred 
promise’, the orthodox account of sovereignty offers closure: an 
overcoming that has already been completed. It does so by narrating the 
story of sovereignty as one of progress in the liberal image, where racism 
is presented as a momentary blip (perhaps even a necessary one), in the 
otherwise universal realisation of an international society of formally 
equal sovereign states. Progress – overcoming the racist blip – is 
achieved through the principle of recognition, the idea ‘that every other 
state had the right to claim and enjoy its own sovereignty as well’ (Wight, 
cited in Ruggie, 1993: 162). In the orthodox account, decolonisation 
confirms this image of progress; a moment in the unfolding and extension 
of formal equality among states, where those previously excluded by 
racism are eventually recognised. 
  
To be clear, it is not my intention to judge the historical record of national 
liberation here, nor deny its transformative effects. Instead, I want to 
draw attention to the discursive work recognition does in the orthodox 
narrative. That work is redemption, containment and closure. Recognition 
affects the containment of racism by reaffirming the conceptual 
separation of race and sovereignty. It does so by conflating the particular 
outcome of a historical process with a general explanatory concept 
through which that process is ultimately analysed. The reification of 
recognition thus delivers, through three moves, an internal coherence to 
sovereignty while repressing its internal contradictions. Firstly, recognition 
becomes central to the definition of sovereignty, a sine qua non, a 
necessary and sufficient condition: for a state to be sovereign it must be 
recognised as such by other sovereign states. Secondly, it delimits the 
analytical scope of race to discursive and/or legal struggles over the 
recognition of colonised peoples within the confines of the already existing 
state-system. Thirdly, it removes from view the contested character of 
anticolonial demands and, in particular, perspectives in the radical 
 7 
anticolonial tradition that have been (and still are) critical of projects that 
conclude with state recognition. The reification of recognition in the 
orthodox account thus facilitates a redemptive closure in which both the 
state-system and racism are understood as settled. The former is 
naturalised as the only possible reality of world politics. The latter is 
presented as a problem solved through the recognition of those 
previously excluded from ‘international society’. Via redemptive closure, 
the orthodox account consigns racism to the past while reaffirming the 
present validity and future existence of the state-system. Case closed. 
  
The orthodox account thus produces a distinctively IR version of 
postracial ideology, by ‘fixing “real” racism solely in historical events’ 
(Lentin, 2016: 34) and disavowing its contemporary reproduction. In 
treating race and racism as anachronisms, ‘the continuities between 
racisms past and present are made undecidable’, separate and deniable 
(ibid. 35). Consequently, interrogations of race and racism are either 
avoided or ‘related principally to the attitudes and actions of singular 
regimes and individuals’ (ibid. 34). In the postracial study of sovereignty 
race and racism are, at worst, irrelevant. At best, racism could perhaps 
be studied outside of the disciplinary boundaries and concerns of IR, as a 
secondary or ‘domestic issue’ concerned with questions of identity and 
culture (Anievas, Manchanda and Shilliam, 2014: 9; Henderson, 2007: 
330). Through the orthodox account the conceptual separation of race 
and sovereignty is inscribed into the very disciplinary definition of IR. 
Racialisation, colonial crisis and sovereignty 
There is therefore much at stake in developing a distinctly IR-theorisation 
of racism, which is able to recover its materiality and structural character. 
This section is concerned with how we might theorise the co-articulation 
of race and sovereignty through the idea of racial sovereignty. To help us 
do so, consider the following three passages from authors outside of IR. 
Although each are writing from very different places and disciplines, all 
describe race in connection to the ways authority, territory and population 
are produced, ordered and classified through colonial practices. 
  
Firstly, Achille Mbembe (2001: 32): 
‘The [colonial] government related... to a territory that constituted the 
colony. The colonial territory had its space, its shape, its borders. It had its 
geological make-up and its climates. It had resources; it had its soils, its 
minerals, its animal and plant species, its empty lands. In short, it had its 
qualities. There were, above all, the people who inhabited it, their characters 
and their customs... their ways of acting and thinking, their habits, the 
events they have lived. It is these people who were labelled natives. They 
constituted the raw material, as it were, of government. They had to be 
enclosed in relations of subjection, initially known as “politique des races” 
and later “politique indigène.”’  
Secondly, la paperson (2017: 5): 
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‘In the alienation of land from life, alienable rights are produced: the right to 
own (property), the right to law (protection through legitimated violence), 
the right to govern (supremacist sovereignty), the right to have rights 
(humanity). In a word, what is produced is whiteness. Moreover, it is not 
just human beings who are refigured in the schism. Land and nonhumans 
become alienable properties, a move that first alienates land from its own 
sovereign life. Thus we can speak of the various technologies required to 
create and maintain these separations, these alienations, Black from 
indigenous, human from nonhuman, land from life.’  
Thirdly, Gargi Bhattacharyya (2018: 73): 
‘This question – of the interplay between populations and territories – 
returns again and again in considerations of history, violence and global 
(in)justice. However, in the discussion of ‘race’, it is more usual for particular 
populations to be regarded as embodiments of depleted territories. Even 
when displaced from regions “classified as underdeveloped”, bodies are read 
as already depleted.’  
For each of these authors, race is inseparable from what Bhattacharyya 
describes as ‘associative chains’ between populations, territories and 
authority, which ‘works to transform some spaces into geographical 
incarnations of racialized populations’ (ibid.). These associative chains are 
not linear, but instead cross-hatched or tangled, whereby colonial claims 
and practices coagulate and collapse authority, populations and territories 
into each other, through alienation, dispossession, death, extraction, 
enclosure and/or exploitation. It is through the differentiating effects of 
these practices (for example possession/dispossession; life/death) that 
various tangles of authority-population-territory are hierarchically 
classified into categories of white and not-white4; human, non-human and 
not-quite-human (Weheliye 2014). 
  
In this understanding, race and racism are the doctrinal termination 
points of these tangled associations. The analytical secret of race is not to 
be found in the ascriptive identities or cultures we find at the conclusion 
of this tangling. White, black, brown, indigenous, etc are not cultures or 
identities (la paperson, 2017: 10) but assemblages (Weheliye, 2014; 
Puar, 2007) of the processes, social relations and struggles that precede 
and produce them. Race and racism are effects (Ahmed, 2002: 47) of the 
enactments through which colonial relations are created and reproduced, 
and products of colonial dispossession and domination. 
  
These enactments have been conceptualised by various authors as 
racialisation (among others Ahmed 2002; Banton, 1977; Wolfe, 2016) 
which is ‘prior to and not limited to racial doctrine’ (ibid. 10). Racialisation 
denotes those practices whereby ‘colonialism refashions its human terrain’ 
and ‘put race into action’, through dispossession, alienation, extraction, 
enslavement, enclosure, genocide and categorisation (ibid.). In particular, 
racialisation is apparent in specific, localised, techniques and strategies of 
domination deployed in certain conjunctures of colonial crisis: 
‘racialisation represents a response to the crisis occasioned when 
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colonisers are threatened with the requirement to share social space with 
the colonised’ (Wolfe, 2016: 14). 
  
As a practice, racial sovereignty is one particular but prevalent kind of 
racialisation, a specific strategic response to colonial crisis. More 
precisely, racial sovereignty conceptualises the conjunctural enactments 
whereby associative chains between authority, population, territory are 
tangled together. Racial sovereignty denotes those technologies of 
colonial governance that seek to ‘promote social stability in the face of 
instabilities and insecurities’ (Goldberg, 2002: 39), ‘when the naturalness 
of the given order is shaken’ (Doty 1996a; 141), by collapsing together 
authority, population and territory into differentiated and hierarchically 
classified ‘units’. The practice of racial sovereignty is a practice of 
racialised ordering. 
  
In contrast, as an analytic, the study of racial sovereignty is about 
grasping and untangling these associative chains of authority-territory-
population as distinctly racialized formations. This is useful in the 
following two ways, which I present for the way in which they might 
disturb the strategies of abstraction and redemption in the orthodox 
account. Firstly, racial sovereignty revises the conceptual image we have 
of world politics. Racial sovereignty is not contained by the nation-state, 
although it may often be articulated through it. Take, for example, the 
role of colonial companies in establishing and administering territorialised 
authority in the 17th-19th centuries; or the contemporary prevalence of 
outsourcing security companies that manage infrastructures of military 
conquest, enforce borders or administer carceral practices in the criminal 
justice system. The mobilisation of non-state technologies in the making 
of racial sovereignty burst the bounds of state-centric approaches. 
However, while racial sovereignty breaks from territorialised thinking it 
does not transcend space and geographical difference. Instead, racial 
sovereignty depends on differentiation which may, at times, require 
spatial compartmentalisation (Fanon, 1963) or bordering practices that 
segregate, canalise and contain racialised populations. 
  
Consequently, racial sovereignty emphasises hierarchy not anarchy in ‘the 
international system’. But racial sovereignty as an analytic escapes the 
spatial binaries that extant theorisations of hierarchy hinge on: 
West/Rest, North/South, developed/underdeveloped, core/periphery. For 
example, in the case of settler-colonialism, core and periphery are not 
spatially distinct and geographically distant but congealed ‘on selfsame 
land’ (Tuck, Guess, Sultan, 2014). These binaries collapse also when 
grappling with the racialisation of ‘non-indigenous’ peoples within the 
European metropolis (Bhattacharyya, 2018: 18-19; Turner, 2018). There 
is a ‘spatial immediacy’ (la paperson, 2017: 3) to these kinds of 
racialisation which does not comfortably map onto classical spatial 
binaries. From the vantage point of racial sovereignty, and in contrast to 
the geo-historical abstractions of the orthodox account, the colonies are 
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never outside of Europe, or more accurately Europe is never outside of its 
colonies. 
  
Secondly, by situating the making of racial sovereignty as a response to 
colonial crisis, it can be studied historically, conjuncturally and 
relationally. Neither of its component parts – race or sovereignty – are 
fixed or stable but continually contested and subject to ‘coincidences of 
different relations of power’ (Robinson, cited in Bhandar, 2018: 13). This 
means, on one hand, that there are ‘no guarantees’ that a particular 
articulation of race and sovereignty ‘will appear in the same configuration 
across time or jurisdictions’ (ibid. 13). The specificity of any given 
racialised bundle of authority-territory-population requires untangling 
through a historical inquiry of the contestations and coincidences behind 
its making and articulation. 
  
On the other hand, the disputed relations at the heart of racialisation also 
serve as reminder that racial sovereignty is never ‘complete’ but is 
subject to resistance. The authority of racial sovereignty does not ride 
over racialised territories and populations untrammelled, as if they are 
mere objects to be mastered (as much as sovereigns might wish this was 
the case). Racial sovereignty is not absolute authority (as much as it 
might claim to be). Instead, racial sovereignty always encounters 
resistance: uprisings, revolutions, riots, escape and everyday struggle 
mark the ‘intolerable contradictions’ of racial sovereignty. 
  
The prevalence of resistance moreover indicates the structural character 
of racial sovereignty. This has been well captured in settler-colonial 
studies (SCS) and its description of settler sovereignty as a ‘structure not 
an event’ (Wolfe, 2006), requiring continual reproduction through 
strategies that reinscribe colonial authority onto the land and over the 
people inhabiting it.5 In this regard, racial sovereignty cannot only be 
understood as a declaration of authority over a territory, nor theorised 
primarily from a reading of this declaration, but historicised through its 
enactments: alienation, dispossession, enclosure, death, extraction, 
exploitation. As Alissa Macoun and Elizabeth Strakosch note, ‘the flipside 
of invasion being a structure not an event is that sovereignty is a 
constant performance claiming to be an essence’ (quoted in Wolfe 2016: 
36; cf. Weber, 1998). Racial sovereignty is therefore not a ‘done deal’ 
(Kauanui, 2016) but an ongoing process, as much part of the present as 
the past. This way of thinking jars uncomfortably against the redemptive 
closure in the orthodox account. The ongoing global struggle against 
racism and colonialism exposes the unsettling contradictions central to 
redemptive accounts of sovereignty which conclude with state 
recognition. 
  
This section has developed two claims. Firstly, the analytic of racial 
sovereignty generates a distinctive image of world politics in which 
relations between coloniser and colonised are revealed in their spatial 
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immediacy. This attunes us to the role of racialisation in forming 
particular bundles of authority-territory-population, and sovereignty as 
such. By subverting the Eurocentric abstraction in the orthodox account 
we are better able to reconnect the coeval emergence of sovereignty and 
race. Secondly, the analytic of racial sovereignty helps disclose resistance 
to it as a practice. This challenges the redemptive closure of recognition 
in orthodox accounts and helps us see how even after recognition, racism 
remains an central to the practice of – or appeals to – sovereignty. In the 
next two sections I demonstrate these claims in turn. 
Sovereignty in the Virginia Colony 
As suggested in the first section, any ‘genealogy of sovereignty that is 
confined to a Europe with its drawbridges up is necessarily an incomplete 
genealogy’ (Krishna, 2001: 414). A compelling response to this 
Eurocentric partiality has been offered by Jordan Branch, who argues 
modern sovereignty was invented in the ‘New World’ rather than within 
Europe (2012; but see Goettlich, 2018). According to Branch, modern – 
territorially defined – sovereignty emerged as a novel way of articulating 
competing claims between European colonialists over the newly 
‘discovered’ lands of the Americas. First expressed in Iberian colonial 
projects of the late 15th century such practices became ‘unmistakable’ 
(ibid. 284) in the early 17th century thanks to the proliferation of English 
company charters issued for the settlement of North America. For Branch, 
declarations such as the 1606 Royal Charter of Virginia marked the first 
articulations of authority derived from ‘ideas of geometric cartography’, 
using ‘cartographic territoriality to assert control’ over ‘empty spaces’ 
(ibid. 284-285).  
 
These declarations demonstrate the ‘peripheral origins’ of sovereign 
statehood, colonial inventions that would eventually redefine the 
character of political authority in Europe. Branch calls this process 
‘colonial reflection’, whereby novel practices were first perfected in the 
‘New World’ before eventually being transported back to, and applied in, 
Europe. The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, rather than marking the 
beginning of modern sovereignty, was notable for ‘the continuing absence 
of cartographic or geographic language of the kind being used in the New 
World’ (ibid. 287). It wasn’t until the 19th century that political rule based 
on linear territorial exclusivity became the norm in Europe. This took 
place only ‘after the usefulness and legitimacy of linearly bounded 
authority claims were made clear by centuries of colonial practice’ (ibid. 
292). 
  
By emphasising the colonies and reversing the direction of diffusionist 
causality, Branch provides a compelling alternative to the orthodox 
account. Nonetheless, despite his widened empirics, Branch’s study of 
sovereignty remains a matter of diplomatic history, whereby ‘the 
 12 
definition of the modern international system... came about 
predominantly as an unintended consequence of the actions of European 
rulers’ (ibid.). Branch’s focus on colonialism expands the geographical 
stage on which these European diplomatic activities play out – the 
Americas, the ‘New World’, the ‘extra-European’ – but the story IR as a 
tale of Great Power conflicts remains. In turn, the history of sovereignty 
for Branch is one of its declaration: a series of discrete diplomatic events 
in the form of European edicts, treaties, and charters. In contrast, 
indigenous presence on colonised land is acknowledged by Branch but 
only in passing, and explained away as a legal problem that was solved 
through ‘an innovative application of natural law principles’ (ibid. 284). 
That Branch does not mention race in his alternative account is therefore 
indicative of a wider set of discursive procedures: talking about 
Eurocentrism without mentioning racism (Sabaratnam, 2019); treating 
colonialism as an event rather than a structure (Wolfe, 2006). 
  
How might we re-read this history from the analytic of racial sovereignty? 
A closer interrogation of one of Branch’s cases – the 17th century 
colonisation of Virginia (or rather Tsenacommacah) – can help us see how 
sovereignty was less declared through treaty but produced in response to 
colonial crisis. The following historical exposition is presented to give a 
clearer view of the formation of this colonial crisis in the Virginia colony 
and how English settlers responded to it through the interrelated practices 
of racialisation and sovereignty formation. Recovering this history, I 
suggest, provides a corrective to the geo-historical abstractions in the 
orthodox account.  
 
English claims in Virginia rested on the ‘discovery doctrine’; the idea that 
possession and/or sovereignty over lands could be declared and claimed 
by those who first occupied and productively used otherwise ‘empty’ and 
‘unimproved’ territory. The 1606 Charter effectively declared the 
Americas res nullius, giving English settlers, in its own words, ‘licence to 
make habitation, plantation, and to deduce a colony of sundry of our 
people into that part of America, commonly called Virginia . . . not now 
actually possessed by any Christian Prince or people’ (Hening, 1799: 57-
66). Notably, during the drafting of the Charter, objections were raised 
within the Virginia Company that any acknowledgement of indigenous 
presence on these lands would lead to future legal dilemmas, as it had 
done in Spanish colonial projects a century before (Williams, 1990: 202-
204). Consequently, the English proceeded on the assumption that 
sovereignty over Virginia required no legal justification and would simply 
manifest itself. The imagined lack of native possession over these lands, 
the very absence of the native, was therefore a precondition for territorial 
claims in the 1606 Charter.  
 
The problem for the English was that these lands were not empty nor 
were they unimproved. Native inhabitation (the indigenous Powhatan 
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confederacy was home to around 9,000 people) and cultivation of land 
was starkly demonstrated when indigenous communities provided food 
and shelter to the first English arrivals who were struggling to survive on 
unfamiliar terrain. The reality of native presence therefore structured the 
‘interlude between the theoretical conquest inherent in discovery and the 
reality of effective conquest, manifest in extinguishment’ (Wolfe 2016: 
144). Effective conquest – through an eventual construction of a strict 
division between English and Powhatan land and a territorial demarcation 
between inside and outside – was only definitively established in the 
1630s, long after the 1606 Charter had been written (Vaughn, 1978). 
Markedly, in 1611, on the eve of the 1612 Charter, proposals were made 
to establish demarcated borders separating English land from Powhatan 
land, but were rejected by colonial governors. This suggests that the 
making of sovereignty was not exhausted by its declaration, but 
assembled over time in response to colonial crisis. 
 
Key to this assembly was racialisation, a set of practices which 
hierarchically classified and differentiated native populations to facilitate 
settler domination. The English articulated this in two contrasting ways. 
The first involved descriptions of ‘the savage’ as noble: not-quite-human, 
little better than beasts, but salvageable through English tutelage. Here, 
the colonial project was one of ‘salvation’, teaching ‘savages’ to abandon 
their cultures, norms and social relations through intermarriage, 
conversion and education in English ways. The second image of was that 
of the monstrous ‘savage’, the native as bestial, demonic and not-human. 
In this image, indigenous peoples were considered unassimilable, beyond 
the pale of civilization and an existential threat. Here, the colonial project 
was one of ‘extirpation’ and ‘perpetuall warre’.6 
 
The English relationship with the Powhatan confederacy oscillated 
between these two images. In this regard, the two images of ‘the savage’ 
were reflections of different strategies deployed by settlers in response to 
colonial crisis. Although nonidentical and indeterminate, these strategies 
were indicative of an underlying continuity in the practice of racial 
sovereignty: colonial dispossession. Nonetheless, one strategy won out. 
The English eventually abandoned attempts at assimilation and turned to 
the unequivocal pursuit of ‘unrestrained enmity toward’ and ‘almost total 
separation’ from ‘the savages’ (Vaughn, 1978: 58).  
 
There were two turning points which informed this ‘policy shift’. The first 
was the formation of the tobacco plantation and, by 1619, an explosion in 
its profitability. This confirmed a change in English colonial aims from a 
geopolitical and religious rivalry with Spain to a commercial enterprise 
justified ‘on grounds of economic efficiency’ (Williams, 1990: 193). 
Extractivist methods used by English cultivators rendered tobacco 
production a land intensive enterprise (Craven, 2006). As profitability 
rose, European settlers flocked to Virginia, bringing indentured and 
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enslaved labour to their plantations and generating a near exponential 
demand for new settlements (Horn, 1988: 179; 184). Under these 
demands, the fact of native presence on potentially cultivable land 
appeared in the minds of the English as a ‘hindrance’, an ‘obstacle to 
colonial growth’ and an intractable problem (Arneil, 1996: 77). 
Subsequently, indigenous communities came to be seen less as 
potentially convertible subjects but more as ‘the dehumanized entry 
barrier to the lawfully mandated sovereignty of the English over the 
underutilized, savage lands of the New World’ (Williams, 1990: 194). The 
second turning point was an act of indigenous resistance. On March 22nd 
1622, the Powhatan confederacy, increasingly frustrated with the 
widening English incursions onto their land, conducted a coordinated 
attack on the Virginia Colony. 347 English settlers were killed in a day, 
reducing the colony’s population by a quarter. The English response was 
brutal, turning to a strategy of total war against indigenous communities 
regardless of whether they had supported the uprising of 1622. Over the 
course of a decade long conflict, the English established an infrastructure 
which separated coloniser from colonised. This involved permanently 
expelling Powhatans from colonial territories and conjoining regions, 
redefining Virginia as an exclusively English domain and forbidding any 
relations or communications with indigenous peoples (other than those 
diplomatically sanctioned). By 1634, the English had built and fortified a 
palisade, with lookouts instructed to shoot any indigenous peoples 
attempting to pass: 
‘The palisade established a country of uncontested English control, a land 
without Indians, whether Powhatan enemies or the friendly tribes who had 
been allies during the war. East of the palisade, Tsenacommacah had been 
transformed permanently into Virginia, its native inhabitants pushed beyond 
the frontier.’ (Kruer, 2009: 93). 
The construction of the palisade marked the culmination point of decades 
long practices of settler-colonial violence, dispossession and racialisation, 
bringing together – effectively rather than theoretically – those defining 
components of modern sovereignty: territory, authority and population 
(in 1634, a local government was established in Virginia, putting in place 
‘a full-fledged hierarchical territorial organisation’ Sack, 1986: 135). This 
was more than simply the manifestation of a pre-given declaration in the 
1606 Charter. Instead, the construction of sovereignty was the specific 
strategic means through which English settlers responded to a particular 
colonial crisis. 
  
It was therefore inseparable from race. The palisade marked an act of 
colonial dispossession which structured the racialisation of Powhatan 
peoples and territories, collapsing them into a single target of English 
settlement and domination. As an infrastructure of bordering, the palisade 
indicated a territorial dividing line between the space of the ‘civilised’ and 
space of the ‘savage’. This division served to legitimise the violence which 
secured the civilised ‘inside’ from the anarchic and uncivilised ‘outside’ 
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where violence could be legitimately and freely exercised. Hence, ‘the 
layers of meaning and history packed into the expression “beyond the 
pale”, a phrase conjuring what lies outside the bounds of “propriety and 
courtesy” but also “protection and safety”’ (Brown, 2010: 57). To modify 
Wendy Brown’s discussion of enclosures (ibid.), there is first 
dispossession and then the sovereign. 
  
We can thus trace how racialised distinctions between the English and 
indigenous peoples during this period became articulated through two 
pillars of racial sovereignty – one relating to population, the other to 
territory. The first pillar: indigenous peoples unequivocally took, in the 
minds of the English, the form of the monstrous (rather than ‘noble’) 
‘savage’: unconvertible, threatening and beyond the pale. The second 
pillar: racialised distinctions were inscribed onto territory, as articulated 
through the ideology of ‘improvement’, which drew together emergent 
practices of capital accumulation, colonial dispossession and racial 
thinking (Bhandar, 2018). The improvement of land through use became 
a necessary marker, in English discourse, of a progression out of ‘the 
state of nature’ into ‘civilisation’. In contrast, the absence of private 
ownership on indigenous land indicated for the English a ‘state of 
primeval simplicity’ (ibid. 48), a wasteland that was lacking improvement. 
The racialised distinctions between cultivated land and wasteland 
subsequently became ‘the basis upon which European colonial powers 
justified their legal doctrines of terra nullius and discovery’ (ibid. 49). 
  
Together, the racialisation of indigenous peoples and lands was affected 
by colonial claims to authority over them. This was vividly captured in 
Edward Waterhouse’s A Declaration of the state of the Colonie and 
Affaires in Virginia, published as the official Virginia Company report on 
the 1622 uprising. In this document, Waterhouse (a Company secretary) 
classified ‘the savages’ as nonhuman: ‘beasts... more fell than Lions and 
Dragons’ (in Kingsbury, 1905). Waterhouse’s publication also 
propagandised for warfare as a means of dispossession: 
‘our hands which before were tied with gentleness and fair usage, are now 
set at liberty by the treacherous violence of the Savages... we, who hitherto 
have had possession of no more ground than their waste... may now by right 
of War, and law of Nations, invade the Country, and destroy them who 
sought to destroy us... Now their cleared grounds in all their villages (which 
are situated in the fruitfullest places of the land) shall be inhabited by us.’ 
(ibid.) 
This text is revealing not just for the assertions of sovereignty and racism 
alongside each other. Although these moves are striking, we also see how 
acts of dispossession structure the seemingly contradictory racialisation of 
indigenous territories as simultaneously ‘waste’ and ‘fruitfullest’. When 
read from the analytic of racial sovereignty, however, there is no 
incongruity at all. These images can coexist precisely because they are 
cohered through the practice of racial sovereignty in two ways. Firstly, 
land was made ‘waste’ by the English not just ideologically but through 
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colonial conquest and in particular the methods of ‘feed fight’. This 
involved the devastation of indigenous means of subsistence by looting 
the products of their cultivation, clearing villages or destroying crops 
altogether (Lee, 2010). The racialised term ‘waste’ as a marker of 
‘savagery’ was not already given in the materially of the land, nor was it 
solely an ideological invention, but had to be produced by colonial 
dispossession. Secondly, this same dispossession rendered the land 
‘fruitfullest’. Here Waterhouse expressed a wider colonial discourse that 
assumed land abundance was natural, a coincidence of where ‘savages’ 
were ‘situated’, rather than the result of indigenous labour. After all, 
improvement was the basis for English possession (and, eventually, a 
marker of their whiteness). This assumption however could only be 
sustained by alienating indigenous peoples from their land and 
abstracting that land from their labour. In sum, it was dispossession that 
transformed Tsenacommacah into Virginia; Waterhouse’s declaration that 
‘their cleared grounds... shall be inhabited by us’ was an assertion of 
racial sovereignty as a practice, tangling together authority-territory-
population through the conceptual abstraction and concrete erasure of 
indigenous life. 
  
Reading Virginian colonisation through the analytic of racial sovereignty 
recovers the missing colonial history in the orthodox account on which the 
separation of race and sovereignty depends. As a mode of analysis, we 
have seen how racial sovereignty can be used to disclose the relationship 
between race and sovereignty. Through this analysis, we have seen the 
operation of racial sovereignty as a practice in which race and sovereignty 
are co-articulated as a response to colonial crisis. We have also seen how 
the practice of racial sovereignty generates the very abstractions that 
contain and therefore deny its racial character. As a practice, racial 
sovereignty is constantly trying to hide its tracks through strategies of 
containment and closure. As an analytic, racial sovereignty helps us 
recover and critique the concealed trails of its continuing circulation. 
Beyond All Recognition 
So this is not the end of the story. By 1644, following the defeat of two 
further indigenous uprisings, Virginia was recognised as sovereign by the 
Powhatan confederacy. The treaty between settlers and natives ratified a 
legal separation of Virginia from Tsenacommacah, including reserve land 
for Powhatan inhabitation to the north of the York river. This treaty 
moreover prevented Powhatan movement through, or residence in, 
Virginian territories, stating ‘any Indians do refare to or make any abode 
upon the said tract of land, upon pain of death, and it shall be lawful for 
any person to kill any such Indian’ (Henning, 1799: 323-25). The treaty 
also ‘retained the right to expand English territory at will’ (Kruer, 2009: 
97). It therefore marked the use of recognition as a means of extending 
English authority ‘via indigenous communities who had subordinated 
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themselves within an English-dominated hierarchy’ (Lee, 2010). By co-
opting some indigenous communities as ‘native leadership’, the English 
encouraged greater hierarchy among indigenous groups in order to divide 
resistance. 
  
This act of recognition was deployed as a settler practice of racial 
sovereignty, a response to colonial crisis. Recognition helped constitute a 
‘founding violence’, which ‘underpinned not only the right of conquest but 
all the prerogatives flowing from that right’ (Mbembe, 2001: 25). It pulled 
together those component parts of sovereignty – populations, territory 
and authority – by creating ‘the space over which it was exercised’ and 
asserting ‘itself as the sole power to judge its laws’ (ibid.). At the same 
time, recognition was racialising, giving ‘the natives a clear notion of 
themselves in proportion to the power that they had lost’, whereby 
‘anything that did not recognize this violence as authority, that contested 
its protocols, was savage and outlaw’ (ibid. 26). 
  
1644 is therefore notable, not as an event, nor because it signals an 
isolated moment where conquest, sovereignty or racialisation was 
completed.7 Nor does it mark the end of indigenous resistance. Instead, 
the violence of 1644 (and all that followed) problematises strategies of 
redemption in the orthodox account, precisely because recognition 
presupposes a settler existence and futurity that requires indigenous 
erasure. As Macoun and Strakosch argue, 
‘Simultaneous occupation is an inherently problematic state for settler 
polities, given that settlers assert a complete jurisdiction over the territory 
and the presence of Indigenous political societies prevents this claim from 
being actualized. Because of this disruption, colonialism is always framed as 
an inherently temporary state which will soon end and give way to 
completed settler sovereignty. In this way settler colonialism entrenches and 
sustains itself “on the basis of its own eventual demise.”’ 
Recognition – when posited as the conclusion of settler-native struggles –
enables redemptive strategies of containment and closure, inasmuch as it 
represses ongoing resistance to colonialism while making the authority of 
settler sovereignty appear coherent and complete. This is perhaps why 
the idea of recognition has received such thoroughgoing criticism in the 
anticolonial tradition. Frantz Fanon’s (1967) revision of Hegel’s master-
slave dialectic is instructive for the way he resituates the attendant 
struggle for recognition in a colonial context. Fanon argues recognition is 
not mutually and reciprocally defined but instead bestowed by and for the 
master to sustain their dominance. By persuading the slave into accepting 
a relation of hierarchy, and their subordinate position within it, 
recognition generates a psycho-affective prop that simultaneously 
obscures (contains) and reproduces colonial relations. This argument has 
since been brilliantly marshalled by Glen Sean Coulthard (2014) in his 
critique of recognition. Coulthard explains how: 
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‘in situations where colonial rule does not depend solely on the exercise of 
state violence, its reproduction instead rests on the ability to entice 
Indigenous peoples to identify, either implicitly or explicitly, with the 
profoundly asymmetrical and nonreciprocal forms of recognition either 
imposed on or granted to them by the settler state and society.’ (ibid. 25) 
Both Fanon and Coulthard therefore offer a warning: in colonial contexts, 
forms of recognition that preserve the categories of both native and 
settler involve internalising the racialised hierarchies on which these 
relations rest and accepting the future existence of the coloniser. 
Recognition reproduces the generative structures of colonial domination, 
leaving its substantive hierarchies intact (Coulthard, 2014: 35-40). 
  
Fanon is less appreciated for how this critique of recognition might apply 
to international relations, despite his extensive work on struggles for 
national liberation. In these writings, Fanon was critical of delimiting 
visions of national liberation that ended with the removal of former 
colonial rulers. Without reconfiguring colonial hierarchies internationally, 
liberation would remain an unfinished project: ‘colonialism and 
imperialism have not settled their debt to us once they have withdrawn 
their flag and the police force from our territories’ (Fanon, 1963). Fanon 
was wary that these limited visions would, tragically, sustain 
subordination and dependence to former colonial powers, while 
reproducing class and racism within and between newly liberated nations 
(ibid.). 
  
Fanon offered these arguments not to dismiss demands for recognition as 
unimportant. Instead, he suggested recognition would become 
problematic when envisaged as an end-in-itself (Go, 2013: 218). In 
contrast Fanon, like many of his contemporaries, understood national 
liberation as beginning a revolutionary project of ‘worldmaking’ 
(Getachew, 2019) – a localised starting point in the longer, international, 
struggle against colonialism. A unifying theme in Fanon’s work is 
therefore the incompleteness of decolonisation when limited to a politics 
of recognition. Equally, Fanon resisted heralding recognition as the 
conclusion of debates around colonialism, race and sovereignty. 
  
I discuss Fanon against Virginia not to argue that all forms of recognition 
follow the same historical patterns. Nor am I primarily concerned with 
whether he was ‘right’. Instead, Fanon is instructive because his critique 
of recognition articulates the memory of movements for liberation that did 
not stop at recognition. That Fanon continues to inspire contemporary 
anticolonial and antiracist struggles indicates moreover the enduring 
significance of this political tradition. These movements historically and 
contemporaneously disturb the redemptive closure in the orthodox 
account by continually breaking out of its strategies containment and 
declaring the debts of colonialism unsettled.  
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Reading with Fanon might therefore help IR rethink the place of 
recognition in its disciplinary histories. But this would require a longer and 
more substantive study than what can be offered here. Instead, these 
criticisms of recognition render visible the ongoing substantive hierarchies 
of colonial domination that undergirds international politics. By 
demonstrating how racialized practices of sovereignty burst the bounds of 
what is formally promised by recognition, this intervention also moves us 
away from exhausting the analytics of race and racism through 
discussions of culture and identity. Our discussion of racial sovereignty 
must therefore return to an analysis of the ongoing character and 
materiality of its practices. To do so, I now outline what racial sovereignty 
might say about the revival of sovereignty talk in the politics of Brexit. 
Brexit: Colonial Crisis Comes Home 
By turning to Brexit, I do not seek to conflate different histories and 
practices of racial violence. Nor am I arguing that either race or 
sovereignty should be treated as stable entities that are unchanging, 
absolute and complete. Instead, my intention in this section is to 
demonstrate how practices of racial sovereignty are not limited 
exclusively to the specific context of settler-colonialism but are entangled 
with, refracted through and rearticulated in different geographical and 
historical contexts where colonial relations are apparent. This section 
therefore considers whether contemporary claims to and desires for 
sovereignty in the context of Brexit disclose an otherwise disavowed 
colonial crisis in Britain. 
 
In exploring this idea, I moreover hope that the analytic of racial 
sovereignty might draw on, connect with and build on wider examinations 
of Brexit’s racialized politics. For example, Sweta Rajan-Rankin (2017) 
has noted the prevalence of the racializing distinctions between ‘us and 
them’ during the Brexit campaign, as well as the marked increase of 
racist hate-crime after the referendum. For Satnam Virdee and Brendan 
McGeever (2018: 1807), these hate-crimes were notable given the 
references to Brexit that accompanied their enactment and that they 
targeted not just EU migrants but people racialized as Muslim, brown and 
black. Tina Patel and Laura Connelly (2019) have shown how anti-
immigration rhetoric offered a new, ‘more palatable’ and ‘post-racial’ 
mode through which hostility to racialized others could be articulated. 
Gurminder Bhambra has argued that concerns around migration have 
secured their ‘legitimacy’ by conjuring racialized images of an imagined 
‘white working class’. While legitimising ‘analyses that might otherwise 
have been regarded as racist’ (Bhambra, 2017: 214), a focus on the 
specifically white experiences of economic dislocations brought about by 
globalisation has displaced ‘structures of racialized inequality from the 
conversation’ (ibid. 218). For Robbie Shilliam (2018), then, those 
discussions around the economy and migration that focussed on the white 
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working class were framed by long-held racialized distinctions between 
‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving poor’. 
 
What role did sovereignty play in these dynamics? After all, sovereignty 
was cited, alongside immigration, as the main reason people voted Leave 
(Carl, 2018). It was the third most used term in media coverage of Brexit 
in 2016, behind only ‘immigration’ and ‘economy’. Sovereignty was 
moreover most commonly mobilised alongside and in connection with 
these latter terms (Moore and Ramsay, 2017). Calls for sovereignty also 
primarily helped articulate a desire for ‘control’ ‘autonomy’, ‘self-
determination’, ‘independence’ and ‘liberation’, often in opposition to the 
perceived effects of globalisation and, especially, immigration.  
 
This trend was not separate from the wider discourses of racialisation that 
marked Brexit. Reclaiming sovereignty from the EU was regularly framed 
by prominent Leave campaigners as a question of national security 
against a Muslim threat on and within Britain’s borders. For example, 
Nigel Farage drew an unfounded connection between migration from Syria 
and terrorist attacks in France and Belgium, to claim the ‘EU’s open 
borders make us less safe’ (see Virdee and McGeever, 2018: 1806). The 
Leave EU campaign presented migration as simultaneously an EU 
imposition and security threat, given in the racialized figure of the 
Muslim. Leave EU’s “Breaking Point” poster infamously ‘pictured Middle 
Eastern refugees queuing at Europe’s borders. The subheading read: “We 
must break free of the EU and take back control”’ (ibid.).  
  
Across these racialized threats of terrorism and immigration, sovereignty 
was presented as the mechanism through which Britain could ‘take back 
control’. That is, while fears of racialized threats may explain what drove 
some to vote Leave, sovereignty articulated the means through which 
that threat would be eventually dispelled and contained. Sovereignty, was 
therefore about fairly conventional, but ultimately racialized, concerns 
around authority over a territory and the need to protect that territory 
and its population from external and internal threats. 
 
Contemporary calls for sovereignty in the context of Brexit therefore 
disclose a response, albeit disavowed, to a colonial crisis ‘coming home’. 
In making this claim, I follow a number of interventions that have 
situated their analysis of Brexit in the historical context of British 
colonialism and the specificity of its moment of collapse (Bhambra, 2017; 
El-Enany, 2016; Patel and Connolly 2019; Shilliam, 2018; Virdee and 
McGeever, 2018). ‘Colonial crisis coming home’ here denotes the coming 
together of two dynamics that have defined post-WWII Britain. Firstly, the 
collapse of the British empire initiated a transformation in the ‘imagined 
community’ of Britain, from a multiracial Commonwealth to a 
predominantly white nation-state. This change occasioned ‘a crisis of 
national identity that called into question the boundaries of the political 
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community. Who was to be considered on the inside and who was to be 
considered on the outside?’ (Doty, 1996: 124). Gilroy (2004) has aptly 
described this moment through the socio-psychological affect of 
‘postcolonial melancholia’. The loss of imperial hegemony at once 
produced a feeling of ‘aching loss’ (ibid. 95) and a ‘guilt-ridden loathing 
and depression’, which today combine in ‘Britain’s xenophobic responses 
to the strangers who have intruded upon it more recently’ (ibid. 98). 
‘Incomers’, Gilroy writes, are ‘unwanted and feared precisely because 
they are unwitting bearers of the imperial and colonial past’ (ibid. 110).  
 
Secondly, the end of empire also signalled the beginning of so-called 
‘mass migration’ from the colonies to the imperial metropole, famously 
marked by the 1948 arrival in London of the HMT Empire Windrush. 
Although often presented as an effort to ‘rebuild Britain’, Windrush 
signified the beginning of a structural shift in colonial relations, 
conditioned by the dual crisis of imperial involution and over-
accumulation: 
 ‘The relative-surplus population or ‘surfeit’ drawn on from the Caribbean and 
Indian sub-continent to fuel post-war British capitalist expansion was both a 
product of an over-accumulation of capital in Britain fostered by imperial 
protection as well as a product of the specific forms of capital accumulation’ 
(Harris, 1993: 9).  
The integration of this ‘surfeit’ effectively, albeit partially, rehabilitated a 
racialized colonial regime of labour by reassembling it in the British 
‘homeland’. Here, policies enacted by employers, the state and trade 
unions enforced a hierarchy of labour, which assigned Caribbean and 
South Asian workers more precarious employment on lower wages, at 
longer and more unsociable hours, in semi- and unskilled jobs (Harris, 
1993; Lewis, 1993). This racialized labour regime was moreover upheld 
through discriminatory practices in housing, education and policing, racist 
enactments of street violence, and ever-narrowing conceptions of British 
citizenship (Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies 1982).  
 
The tension between these two aspects – postcolonial melancholia on the 
one hand, the presence of racialized labour exploitation on the other – 
were early manifestations of the colonial crisis coming home, a growing 
anxiety felt by colonisers over the requirement to share the British 
mainland with the colonised.8 With these shifts, the racializing practices 
that had long been exported to Britain’s ‘peripheries’ were transferred to 
and progressively internalised into its ‘core’.  
 
In echoes of the Virginia experience, the British response to this crisis 
oscillated between the strategic poles of assimilation and exclusion. The 
former presented assimilation as a linear process whereby racial enmity 
would eventually give way to accommodation as ‘aliens’ shed their 
‘outmoded’ and ‘strange’ behaviours and became Anglicised. Exclusionism 
was articulated through the idea of repatriation; the wholesale removal of 
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‘foreign’ elements from Britain to prevent the dilution and eradication of 
British culture. Most infamously argued in Enoch Powell’s Rivers of Blood 
speech, repatriation expressed fears of Britain being ‘swamped’ by non-
white people, eventually outnumbering the ‘ethnically white’ and 
rendering them a ‘minority’ in their ‘own nation’. 
 
Both assimilationist and exclusionist discourses drew on racializing 
practices that inscribed the hierarchies they presupposed on the body of 
the colonised. This included the construction of a number of racialized and 
gendered characteristics in those who arrived from the colonies through 
which they were marked as ‘foreign’, ‘alien’, ‘black’ and ‘brown’. First 
perpetuated in media and political discourses as moral panics, before 
becoming more widely embedded as ‘common sense’, such constructions 
included: criminality; sexual promiscuity and overbreeding; lack of 
hygiene; atavistic cultural or religious practices; rootlessness; despotic 
family structures; laziness; absentee parentage; unruly and exceptionally 
unintelligent children; an unique propensity to misogyny and 
homophobia; overly sensitive and/or overly aggressive dispositions; 
violence (Lawrence, 1982). On the assimilationist side, these were 
characteristics to be eradicated through British tutelage. On the 
exclusionist side, these were intractable threats that would lead to the 
decay of Great Britain.   
 
These racializing responses to colonial crisis were accompanied and 
reinforced by enactments of racial sovereignty. Since WWII, a succession 
of British government policies have redefined citizenship and national 
belonging in ways that transformed conceptions of what constitutes 
British population, territory, and authority. Ever growing restrictions on 
non-white migration from the Commonwealth (and beyond) were 
introduced through the Commonwealth Immigration Acts of 1962 and 
1968, the Immigration Act of 1971 and the British Nationality Act of 1981 
(Doty, 1996: 130-133). Each act narrowed the definition of British 
citizenship to specifically white Britons, while turning ‘darker’ British 
subjects – those from the Caribbean, Asia and Africa – into migrants, 
foreigners and aliens. Each act, moreover, was accompanied with novel 
practices through which the racialization of citizenship could be enforced. 
For example, the 1962 Act created provisions to deport Commonwealth 
citizens. The 1968 Act was marked by the opening of the first immigration 
detention centre in Harmondsworth, with additional centres opened after 
the 1981 Act.  
 
Brexit, with its associated demand for sovereignty, is but the latest 
iteration of this much longer racialized response to colonial crisis. Appeals 
to sovereignty in the context of Brexit are effective precisely because they 
are so readily associated with long durational practices of racial 
sovereignty that have reconfigured articulations of authority, territory and 
population by narrowing the confines of British citizenship, national 
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belonging and identity to whiteness. They are moreover effective in 
articulating a perceived solution to and protection from racialized threats 
– the immigrant; the terrorist – themselves constructed and rendered 
problematic through these same practices of racial sovereignty When read 
as a response to colonial crisis, contemporary appeals to sovereignty 
disclose their racialized substance, as a desire to reinscribe racialized 
authority over the territory and population of Britain, and demarcate 
inside from outside through racialized acts of bordering. 
Conclusion 
Today, the materiality of racial sovereignty is most vividly expressed in 
the increasing visibility of the border. Enforced destitution, street policing, 
immigration raids, citizenship deprivation, detention, deportation, death – 
these practices expose both a high watermark of racial sovereignty’s 
efficacy but also the increasing normalisation of its racialising practices. 
IR should be attentive, then, to the effect it has in contributing to this 
normalisation through mobilisations of its core disciplinary concept. In 
particular, this article has offered a way of criticising and moving beyond 
the containing and closing effects of the ‘orthodox account’. In doing so, it 
has sought to uncover the long durational, ongoing and structuring effects 
of racial sovereignty in contemporary world politics in ways that cut 
across the specificity of – and variances between – its different 
articulations. Analysing these longer genealogies of racial sovereignty 
suggest contemporary articulations might be especially acute but are not 
exceptional. Equally too, the struggles against racial sovereignty today 
act as a reminder of its ongoing salience but also that it remains far from 
a settled matter. 
 
Beyond IR, I offer this account of racial sovereignty as an alternative way 
of thinking about race that shifts our discussions beyond identity and 
culture. I especially hope that a focus on racial sovereignty can help us 
unearth the ways in which its practices and technologies circulate across 
differently racialised peoples. I do so, however, with three ambiguities 
(and therefore areas for further research) in mind. Firstly, we should be 
aware of, the analytical and political dangers of conflating different 
racisms, different racialising practices and the different colonial relations 
behind them (Bhattacharyya, 2018: 76-78). As I have argued, 
racialisation is not fixed but always uneven and combined in its assembly 
and adaptive in response to its contestation. The contingency of 
racialisation therefore necessitates its historicisation across different 
spatial and temporal contexts. Although I have argued racial sovereignty 
circulates, this circulation needs to be studied in its specificity to avoid the 
sort of abstractions that I have criticised the orthodox account for. 
  
Secondly, as we have seen, sovereignty was a key goal in anticolonial 
projects seeking independence from imperial domination and remains a 
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central demand in liberation movements today (Moreton-Robinson, 2015; 
Reynolds, 1996; Salt 2018; Younis 2018). Future investigations might 
question to what extent the notion of ‘colonial crisis’ and ‘responses to it’ 
can be subverted and rerouted by the colonised in acts of resistance. 
Could sovereignty be practiced in ways that are distinctly antiracist? 
Alternatively, how far could the claim ‘sovereignty is racialised’ be put 
into productive discussion with criticisms of anticolonial nationalism? 
Thirdly, it remains uncertain whether the current hypothesis should be 
restricted to an analysis of European colonial projects, past and present. 
Can postcolonial and non-Western sovereignties be read through the lens 
of racial sovereignty (Hansen and Stepputat, 2005)? These ambiguities 
and questions, I hope, will provide useful prompts for research among 
those seeking to grapple with both sovereignty and racism today. 
 
Notes 
1. For their comments on previous drafts, I would like to thank Ella Jay 
Taylor, Luke de Noronha, Nivi Manchanda, Musab Younis, 
Charmaine Chua, Jacob Kripp, two anonymous reviewers, attendees 
the LSE IR Theory Seminar and the European Journal of 
International Relations 25th Anniversary Workshop (in particular 
Nicholas Wheeler and Darshan Vigneswaran). All mistakes are my 
own.  
2. Although the term ‘racial sovereignty’ is used by Inderpal Grewal 
(2013) in a discussion of extra-state violence, I use it to refer to 
wider practices through which ‘authority’, ‘territory’ and ‘population’ 
are drawn together. 
3. These authors have primarily focused on questions of discourse, 
uneven applications of sovereignty, or alternative articulations of 
sovereignty. I seek to contribute to these discussions by studying 
sovereignty as a practice which does the work of producing 
racialized differentiation independently of any discursive or uneven 
application. 
4. ‘Not-white’ is used for brevity and to indicate a normative centring 
of whiteness rather than any homogeneity across differently 
racialised groups. 
5. I draw on SCS clumsily (Wolfe says ‘invasion is a structure, not an 
event’), caught between the specificity of settler-colonialism and 
indigenous struggle on one hand, and claims that settler 
technologies circulate and extend beyond specific settler-colonial 
contexts on the other (la paperson, 2017). Racial sovereignty is a 
means of thinking between these positions rather than a way of 
equivocating settler-colonialism with other racialising practices. 
6. These terms come from, respectively, Francis Wyatt, governor of 
the colony and Edward Waterhouse, company secretary. All archival 
references are drawn from collections in Hening (1799) and 
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Kingsbury (1905). I have amended spelling within quotations for 
consistency.  
7. Conterminous with the process described here, enslaved Africans 
were forcibly brought to Virginia in increasing numbers over the 
course of the 17th century, to work the tobacco plantations. By 1691, 
to institute a form of social control over enslaved Africans, 
Englishness as a marker of social status gave way to the explicitly 
racialised term ‘white’ (see Allen, 1997). 
8. This is not to argue that people moving to Britain from its colonies 
were harbingers of a racial crisis. Nor is it to argue that racism did 
not exist in Britain prior to Windrush (for a corrective to such 
arguments see Lawrence 1982). 
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